The very context of the commission puts limits on human dominion. The fact that this dominion is a gift from God to the humans He has created imposes the implied limits of God's will on human dominion. These implied limits are further underscored in Gen 1:29-30, where God gives humans only vegetable life for food, not animal life (that comes only after the flood in Genesis 9). The implied limits to human dominion become explicit in the second creation story, Gen 2:8-9, 15-17, which from NT times the Church (as the Synagogue before it) tended to read in conjunction with the first and as interpreting the first. 11 There the Creator explicitly limits human freedom with a direct prohibition under penalty of death: God tells the man he is free to eat of any tree except the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
When the serpent in Genesis 3 tests this prohibition, the limits to man's and woman's dominion stand out with the strongest possible emphasis. The essence of the serpent's temptation is that "when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil" (Gen 3:5 RSV). The sin of the first humans was precisely in wanting to be "like God" or "like gods" (depending on one's translation of the Hebrew k'elohîm; the Greek OT reads "like gods," hôs theoi). Although in Genesis God created humans in His image and gave them dominion over nature, He imposed definite limits on the extent to which they were to image God, have dominion, even to have knowledge. Human desire to exceed this limit, this gulf between God and the humans He created in His image, was the essence of the primeval temptation and sin in Genesis 3. The theology of human dominion in God's image in the Presbyterian documents does not recognize this gulf between God and His human creatures, especially in the areas of human knowledge in Genesis 3 and of taking innocent human life, so strongly emphasized in Genesis 4 and 9.
12 Therefore that theology of dominion misses some of the main dynamics of the creation and fall stories of Genesis on which it claims to be based.
13
To interpret the Ρ creation story by stories in J raises the methodo logical question of historical and canonical criticism. The Synagogue and Church tended to use and read Genesis as a canonical whole. They did not isolate J, E, D, P, and read them independently of one another. Before the era of source criticism, the authority of Scripture for ethics had to be based on the canonical books, not reconstructed sources taken out of their biblical context. In the view of Vatican II, Scripture as canon, rather than isolated sources, continues to be authoritative for ethics. 14 It is true that one of the geniuses of the canon, especially that of the OT, is to preserve texts and strands in tension with one another, thus giving a variety of approaches. But it is also true that some texts were only considered acceptable for the canon when additions were made to them (e.g., the "happy ending" to Job or the ending moderating Qoheleth's cynicism).
In other words, there was a limit to the pluralism acceptable to any believing community. Nor was pluralism in itself considered a value in NT times the way it sometimes is today. One of the main concerns of midrashic forms of exegesis is to find the expected underlying unity in God's word. It was ordinary procedure to interpret Genesis 1 and 2 together. Not until the Enlightenment did the churches begin to read strands of Genesis in isolation from one another.
15
Not only must ethicists treat the whole Genesis creation account and primeval history as a unit; they must also avoid taking one biblical theme 13 Similarly, Hollenbach ("Human Work" 74-75) criticizes Laborem exercens for relying too heavily on the more "metaphysical" Ρ account of creation, without enough balance from the J version, which better expresses the nonideal aspects of human work.
14 "But since sacred Scripture must be read and interpreted with its divine authorship in mind, no less attention must be devoted to the content and unity of the whole of Scripture, taking into account the Tradition of the entire Church and the analogy of faith, if we are to derive their true meaning from the sacred texts" (Dei Verbum, no. 12, in Vatican out of context from the interrelated themes that the canon provides. To focus on human dominion and stewardship over creation and to ignore the fact that only subhuman creation is so subjected to human dominion could be carelessness. Also, despite questions about when the conceived human life becomes a person, commonly-known arguments against abor tion claim that it is the taking of innocent human life. Genetic facts unknown to earlier theologians like Thomas Aquinas are clear that the zygote from the moment of conception has the total genetic make-up it will carry till death. It is clearly human life and not any other kind of life, and a later argument will show that it is loved by God, who has a purpose and destiny for that human life. Questions like the moment of ensoulment can distract from this central truth. 16 One cannot simply ignore the very strong biblical prohibitions against taking innocent human life, as well as the heavy penalties for such killing, in citing «dominion as a justification for abortion. For completeness, I add the summary of positions in the Catholic commentary on the Catholic-Reformed abortion statement: "Among the more common assessments as to when the fetus possesses personhood might be included the following: 1. fertilization-the moment of the joining of the sperm and ovum to create a unique zygote with its own genetic code; 2. implantation-5-8 days after fertilization when the fetus implants itself in the uterine wall; 3. neo-cortex-at approximately 5 weeks when the neo-cortex, indispensable for human activity, begins to appear and develop; 4. formation-after about 7 weeks when the fetus is formed and looks like a human being; 5. quickening-the first detectable movement of the fetus in the womb: 14-20 weeks; 6. viability-somewhere between 20 and 28 weeks when the infant can survive outside the womb; 7. birth-when the child begins its natural life outside the womb.
"Roman Catholics today, with some exceptions, appear to agree that human life begins at conception. In the past, however, and for several centuries, there was general agreement
The Cain and Abel story follows immediately upon the disobedience and punishment of humans in Genesis 3. From NT times, this story has been interpreted as focused on the heinousness of taking innocent human life.
18 For the Presbyterian document to focus almost exclusively on the question of Cain's choice in treating Gen 4:1-16 seems a peculiarity of our own age. 19 Since the main objection to abortion is that it is the taking of innocent human life, the question of whether abortion is this and what the Bible says about it has to be considered in turning to Scripture for guidance.
Within the primeval history alone (Gen 1-11) there are very explicit statements about human life as belonging to God alone and therefore sacred and not under human control or dominion. There are also strong statements about the unjustified taking of human life beyond the story of Cain. In Gen 9:5-6, the "new creation" after the flood, God gives humans subhuman animals for food for the first time, but has a sterni warning against shedding human blood: "For your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning; of every beast I will require it and of man; of every man's brother I will require the life of man. Whoever sheds the blood (kf man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in His ojfai image" (Gen 9:5-6 RSV).
It could hardly be clearer that although humans have been given renewed dominion over subhuman creation (Gen 9:2-3, though the Gen 9:4 prohibition against eating flesh with blood in it explicitly limits even this dominion), God clearly draws the line on dominion before the taking of innocent human life. The word "innocent" does not appear in the passage, but Gen 9:6 gives death as the penalty for the guilty human who takes human life, clearly contrasting shedding of blood as crime from shedding of blood as punishment, as do the death penalties sanctioning misdeeds in the Code of the Covenant. The death penalty is a sign of the seriousness with which the text takes the evil of killing human beings. existence as an individual, i.e., at conception. But if God has a plan for humans from the womb, which is viewed as the place of God's work in shaping human life, this is relevant evidence against the right of other humans to abort God's plan by killing the fetus God has chosen and to whom God has given life.
Even more pervasive than the notion that God makes individual human lives with His purpose for those lives is the related biblical theme of God's initiating love, as exemplified in Eph 1:3-6. God loves us before we can love Him: this is the foundation of salvation by faith, not by works. God's foreordaining love is behind the whole scheme of salvation history and preparation for the Messiah. This pattern of initiating love begins with the very creation of humankind in Gen 1:26: "Let us make adam in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air " It is a small step from God's call of an individual to His creating that individual in the womb in view of that call. This is even foreshadowed in the creation of woman from man in the second creation story. "It is not good for man to be alone. I will make a partner suitable for him" (Gen We have seen the methodological necessity of consulting the canonical context and not just isolated source strands. We have seen problems in isolating biblical themes like dominion and God's image from the stories and contexts in which they occur. We have found conflicts between arguments for abortion from human dominion as God's image and the limitations on human freedom in the same creation and fall stories, where the primeval sin was to try to be like gods or God. We have found conflicts also with the canonical themes of human life as belonging to God alone and sacred and forbidden to humans to take (themes present in the same primeval history), and of God's forming, electing, and calling individuals even in the womb (from other parts of Scripture). Such conflicts undercut these appeals to biblical themes for justification of abortion and illustrate the need for more canonical controls in seeking biblical warrants in contemporary ethics.
This article is primarily focused on the methodological question of uses of Scripture in ethics and the need for greater completeness in the biblical evidence assessed, not on the ethical example of abortion chosen to illustrate the methodological issue. Therefore the article does not claim that the scriptural evidence presented solves all contemporary questions regarding abortion; it acknowledges the need for ethical reasoning on such evidence. It rather tries to show how a fairly typical appeal to scriptural warrants needs to be more thoroughly grounded in the major 
